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Regulation Without Agency: A Practical Response to Private
Policing in United States v. Day*
INTRODUCTION
The popular image of the "mall cop" has created a comical
caricature of private police, or security officers, for many individuals.'
In the movie Paul Blart: Mall Cop, actor Kevin James exemplifies this
image with his portrayal of a mall security guard whose self-doubt
marginalizes his profession when he responds to his own question of
"[w]hat are you trained to do?" with a deflated "[n]othing." 2 The
reality is that private police personnel are frequently trained,
licensed, and regulated and serve a variety of roles, ranging from
property protection to preserving public order.'
Beyond the caricature lies a rich history of policing, both public
and private, which has been extensively explored within the literature
addressing private policing.4 For the purposes of this Recent
Development, this history provides one fundamental takeaway: the
policing function has never been controlled exclusively by the
government, nor have its functional components been rigidly
defined.' As a result, "perceived gaps in the policing services provided
by government" have determined the responsibilities of private
police.6 If a government does not provide adequate preventive,
protective, or investigatory services, then the general public will
frequently demand a private alternative.
* @ 2011 Cooper J Strickland.
1. See, e.g., Mall Cops: Mall of America (The Learning Channel 2010); OBSERVE
AND REPORT (Warner Bros. Pictures 2009); PAUL BLART: MALL COP (Sony Pictures
2009).
2. PAUL BLART: MALL COP, supra note 1.
3. See generally CHARLES NEMETH, PRIVATE SECURITY AND THE LAw 22-59, 70
(3d ed. 2005) (describing the current regulatory requirements applicable to the private
policing industry and the types of duties performed by private police).
4. See David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165, 1193-1229
(1999); Elizabeth E. Joh, Conceptualizing the Private Police, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 573, 579-
85; Ric Simmons, Private Criminal Justice, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 911, 921-24 (2007);
M. Rhead Enion, Note, Constitutional Limits on Private Policing and the State's Allocation
of Force, 59 DUKE L.J. 519, 529-41 (2009).
5. See Sklansky, supra note 4, at 1194.
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 4, at 924-27. But cf Sklansky, supra note 4, at 1168
("[I]t is far from clear to what extent the growing numbers of private security employees
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As the private policing industry continues to grow' and the
variety of services provided by private police expands,9 many
questions remain regarding the legal framework within which this
industry must function."o Of particular concern is the risk of violating
constitutional protections through the exercise of the police
function," including the use of private police to collect evidence by
methods not legally available to public police officers.12
are actually performing functions previously carried out by public officers."). For example,
private police actively fill a perceived gap in the availability of patrol services. See
Sklansky, supra note 4, at 1180. Notably, the armed security officers in United States v.
Day, 591 F.3d 679 (4th Cir. 2010), were providing patrol services at the time of their
encounter with the appellee, Mario Day. See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
8. See Elizabeth E. Joh, The Paradox of Private Policing, 95 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 49, 54 (2004). By one account, there are "nearly three private guards for
every public police officer." Id. at 55. "In the 1970s ... there were approximately 1.4
public police officers for every private guard." Id. at 54-55; see also Heidi Boghosian,
Applying Restraints to Private Police, 70 Mo. L. REV. 177, 191 (2005) ("[P]rivate security
companies employ approximately two million guards, compared to public law
enforcement's 725,000.").
9. In the area of property protection alone, "[u]niformed private officers guard and
patrol office buildings, factories, warehouses, schools, sports facilities, concert halls, train
stations, airports, shipyards, shopping centers, parks, government facilities-and,
increasingly, residential neighborhoods." Sklansky, supra note 4, at 1175. The scope of
private policing is far broader, including intelligence gathering and monitoring,
privatization of policing services by government entities, and corporate policing. See Joh,
supra note 4, at 609-15 (describing the specific roles currently being filled by private
police).
10. See NEMETH, supra note 3, at 68-69. A significant factor behind the questions in
this area is that many private police exercise controversial powers, including "detaining
individuals, conducting searches, investigating crimes, and maintaining order." See Joh,
supra note 8, at 50.
11. See Boghosian, supra note 8, at 177-78. Violations of constitutional protections
were a significant concern of the Day dissent. See Day, 591 F.3d at 690 (Davis, J.,
dissenting in part); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae ACLU of Virginia, Inc. in Support of
Petition for Rehearing at 1-6, Day, 591 F.3d 679 (No. 08-5231), 2010 WL 374017.
12. Joh, supra note 8, at 114-16. The risks are particularly acute given the significant
problems that frequently exist within the industry, including "[h]igh attrition rates,
inadequate personnel screening and selection, substandard training and supervision of
personnel, low pay, and conflicts of interest." Boghosian, supra note 8, at 179. According
to one source, in the area of preassignment training, uniformed security guards receive an
average of four to six hours of training. Id. at 182. Virginia requires unarmed security
officers to receive a minimum of eighteen hours of entry-level training, whereas armed
security officers, like those in Day, receive forty hours of entry-level training. 6 VA.
ADMIN. CODE § 20-171-350 (2010) (including eight hours of arrest authority training for
armed security officers); see also 26 Va. Reg. Regs. 1482, 1519-20 (proposed Feb. 1, 2010)
(proposing an increase in armed security officer training to fifty hours). In contrast,
Virginia requires public law enforcement officers to have a minimum of 580 training
hours. 6 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 20-20-21 (2010).
Training and supervision aside, because private police frequently wear police-style
uniforms and have the opportunity to carry weapons, see Boghosian, supra note 8, at 181
(noting that ten percent of private security employees carry firearms), and execute
1340 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89
This Recent Development examines these issues by considering
United States v. Day, a Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decision that
addresses state action-or government agency' 4-within the context
of the private policing industry. Legal certainty within this context is
elusive, however, because no uniform definition of private policing
exists," and the United States Supreme Court has not determined
whether a delegation of police powers to a private party results in
state action." The uncertain legal status of private policing has left
open many significant issues for lower courts to resolve, including
policy issues associated with the applicability of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments to private policing conduct."
Day addresses whether the constitutional constraints placed on
state actors by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments apply to private
armed security officers."8 Extending Fourth and Fifth Amendment
constitutional restraints to private police would potentially exert
some control over their behavior.19 As noted by Professor Elizabeth
arrests-even if only citizen arrests-private police often communicate a powerful and
easily misunderstood message to the general public. See id. at 204-06. Specifically, "most
individuals stopped by a uniformed security guard assume that the guard possesses legal
authority to search and seize." Id. at 204-05.
13. 591 F.3d 679 (4th Cir. 2010).
14. In Day, the distinction between state action and agency is not always clearly
drawn. Though primarily concerned about whether private actors were agents of the state,
the Day majority also defines its analysis in terms of state action. Compare Day, 591 F.3d
at 687 (describing the public function test as the "theory of agency relied on by the district
court"), with id. at 689 (rejecting the argument that the private actors were in fact "state
actors"). In this Recent Development, the distinction between state action and agency is
important, see infra Parts II, III, but any distinctions should not overshadow the
underlying search for state responsibility.
15. See Joh, supra note 8, at 55. Professor Joh defines "private policing" as "the
various lawful forms of organized, for-profit personnel services whose primary objectives
include the control of crime, the protection of property and life, and the maintenance of
order." Id. (emphasis omitted). Generally, "private policing" will be used in this Recent
Development as opposed to a narrower term like "private security." Cf id. at 67
(describing the difference between "private policing" and the "private security industry").
16. See, e.g., Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 163 n.14 (1978) (stating that the
Court had never determined "the constitutional status of private police forces" and
asserting "no opinion" in this case).
17. See NEMETH, supra note 3, at 68-69. See generally U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V
(sources for search and custodial questioning restrictions). The Fourth Amendment does
not forbid all searches and seizures, but does bar those considered unreasonable. See
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8 (1968). The Fifth Amendment prohibits the use of individual
statements arising out of custodial interrogation unless procedural safeguards are taken to
preserve the individual's freedom from self-incrimination. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
18. See infra Parts II, III.
19. See generally Enion, supra note 4 (arguing for the extension of constitutional
limitations to private police). But see Joh, supra note 8, at 118 (arguing that the transfer of
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E. Joh, however, "the Supreme Court and the lower courts have
repeatedly rejected claims that the federal constitutional constraints
placed on public police should also apply to the private police." 20
Contributing to this trend and in spite of the arrest, search, and
questioning of Day by privately employed armed security officers and
the criminal charges their efforts helped support,2 1 the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals concluded that Virginia's regulation of private
security services did not create an agency relationship between the
government and the armed security officers in Day.2 2 Consequently,
the procedural constraints of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments did
not apply to the armed security officers' conduct.23
Though the armed security officers' freedom from constitutional
criminal procedure in Day generates legitimate concern about the
powers of private police and their potential abuse,24 the Fourth
Circuit's holding is a proper application of current case law. More
importantly, application of the public function test 2 6 and any
subsequent finding of state action based upon Virginia's regulation of
private security service providers is both unwarranted under the facts
in Day and unwise as a matter of public policy. 27 Indeed, a more
promising approach for influencing the behavior of private police is
through robust legislative and administrative oversight of the private
policing industry.
criminal procedure may not control the behavior of private police).
20. Joh, supra note 8, at 93. Exceptions exist, including instances where private police
were deputized and acquired the characteristics of public police officers, see id at 101-02,
or in situations where the private actor is an off-duty police officer, see id. at 104. For cases
involving deputized individuals, see Pratt v. State, 263 A.2d 247, 247 (Md. 1970) (reversing
conviction because evidence was obtained by private employee commissioned to act as a
police officer); Commonwealth v. Leone, 435 N.E.2d 1036, 1040 (Mass. 1982) (concluding
that a "special or deputy police officer" is a state agent subject to the limitations imposed
by the Fourth Amendment). For cases involving off-duty police officers, see State v.
Betsell, 240 S.E.2d 781, 782 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977) (upholding suppression of evidence seized
by off-duty police officer acting as a motel security guard); State v. Wilkerson, 367 So. 2d
319, 321-22 (La. 1979) (vacating guilty plea resulting from off-duty police officer's search
of personal property located within the apartment complex where he worked as a security
guard). For further discussion of the case law associated with these various distinctions,
see Sklansky, supra note 4, at 1244 n.444.
21. See United States v. Day, 591 F.3d 679, 681 (4th Cir. 2010).
22. See id. at 685-86, 688-89.
23. See id. at 689.
24. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae ACLU of Virginia, Inc. in Support of Petition for
Rehearing, supra note 11, at 5-6.
25. See infra Part II.
26. See infra note 110 and accompanying text (defining the public function test).
27. See infra Part III.
28. See infra Part IV. In general, the private policing industry is subject to minimal
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Part I of this Recent Development explores the essential facts
presented in Day. Part II then examines the "two primary factors"
test used by the Day majority in determining that an agency
relationship did not exist between the government and the armed
security officers. Of particular concern to the Day majority was
whether Virginia " 'knew of and acquiesced' " to the armed security
officers' conduct.2 9 Part III considers the Day dissent's application of
the public function test and its argument that state action does exist
within this context, a standard the Day majority considered and
rejected. Finally, Part IV argues that the Day holding provides an
opportunity for governments to exercise meaningful control over
private police through legislative and administrative regulation,
including increased information disclosure to regulatory authorities
and the promotion of civil actions and criminal liability for unlawful
behavior attributable to private police personnel.
I. UNITED STATES V. DAY
On July 5, 2008, shortly after midnight, two on-duty armed
security officers patrolling the Regency Lake apartment complex3 0 in
statutory regulation. See Boghosian, supra note 8, at 178; Joh, supra note 8, at 50;
Simmons, supra note 4, at 927-28. Often, what regulation does exist is associated with
licensing, candidate screening, and mandatory training standards. Simmons, supra note 4,
at 978-79 (noting that there are "no federal guidelines and states enforc[e] widely varying
(but mostly minimal) standards as to licensing, screening, and training"). In some states,
regulation is even nonexistent. Joh, supra note 8, at 50. In the absence of a statutory
framework that is capable of adequately overseeing the behavior of private police, various
civil and criminal remedies serve as backstops for addressing wrongful conduct. See id. at
107-09. For example, if private police personnel wrongfully detain individuals, then tort
and criminal law may provide remedies for false arrest, trespass, or assault. Id. at 109;
Sklansky, supra note 4, at 1166-67. Interestingly, "[t]he legal regime governing private
security ... is strikingly similar to the legal regime that many reformers have advocated
for public law enforcement: deconstitutionalized, defederalized, tort based, and heavily
reliant both on legislatures and on juries." Sklansky, supra note 4, at 1168; see also Marc L.
Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Secret Police and the Mysterious Case of the Missing Tort
Claims, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 757, 758 (2004) (noting that occasional arguments are made for
the regulation of police misconduct through tort actions, but they are often prematurely
dismissed as unworkable). At one time, tort and criminal doctrines "defined the principal
boundaries of permissible public policing." Sklansky, supra note 4, at 1183. As a practical
matter, however, it is difficult to determine how well this system deters private police
abuses. Id. at 1272 (stating further that no one has even tried to determine whether "the
tort system has worked to deter abuses by private security personnel").
29. United States v. Day, 591 F.3d 679, 683 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v.
Jarrett, 338 F.3d 339, 344 (4th Cir. 2003)).
30. See United States v. Day, 590 F. Supp. 2d 796, 799 (E.D. Va. 2008), rev'd, 591 F.3d
679 (4th Cir. 2010). The armed security officers' employer, American Security Group, see
id., provides comprehensive security services to its clients. See Protective Services, AM.
SEC. GRP., http://www.teamasg.com/protective.shtml (last visited Apr. 14, 2011).
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Chesterfield County, Virginia witnessed a gathering outside an
apartment.' The armed security officers witnessed two individuals-
one of whom was the appellee, Mario Day-arguing with persons
inside one of the apartments.3 2 After Day retrieved a gun from a
nearby vehicle, he held the weapon "in a low and ready position"
and proceeded toward the apartment.34 At that time, the armed
security officers exited their patrol vehicle, drew their weapons, and
ordered Day to freeze.35
Upon reaching Day and placing him in handcuffs,36 the armed
security officers conducted a Terry search and questioned Day
without giving him a Miranda warning." The Terry search produced
"no suspicious bulges or hard objects."38 However, after one of the
armed security officers "asked Day if he had 'anything illegal' on
him,"" Day admitted possession of marijuana.' The security officers
removed the marijuana from Day's pocket and questioned him about
the firearm in his possession, which he claimed was for self-defense.4 1
After contacting their superior officer and the local authorities, the
armed security officers turned custody of Day over to a Chesterfield
police officer.4 2 A grand jury subsequently indicted Day for
possession of marijuana and possession of a firearm by a drug user.43
Interestingly, "American Security Group instructs its guards that they 'are there as a
deterrent. [They] are not local police, and [they] cannot conduct [themiselves as such.' "
Brief of the United States at 8, Day, 591 F.3d 679 (No. 08-5231), 2010 WL 832926 (quoting
Joint Appendix at 15).
31. Day, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 799.
32. Id.; see also Brief of the United States, supra note 30, at 10 (describing the event
as " 'some type of verbal altercation' with people inside the apartment" (quoting Joint
Appendix at 21)).
33. Brief of the United States, supra note 30, at 2.
34. Day, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 799.
35. Id.
36. Brief of the United States, supra note 30, at 14.
37. Day, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 799. A Terry search is a protective measure that may be
taken in order to search for weapons regardless of whether probable cause exists for
arrest. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). Miranda warnings require that at the time
of custodial interrogation an individual must be informed of her right to remain silent and
the consequences of waiving that right. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-69
(1966).
38. Day, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 799.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. The district court proceedings made clear that the decision to "arrest" Day was
made by the Chesterfield police officer who responded to the scene. Brief of the United
States, supra note 30, at 13, 15.
43. United States v. Day, 591 F.3d 679, 681 (4th Cir. 2010).
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Prior to trial, Day sought to suppress the evidence obtained by
the armed security officers-the drugs, gun, and his statements"-by
alleging violations of his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.45 The
district court granted Day's motion to suppress the drugs and his
statements regarding the drugs and firearm, but denied the motion as
to the firearm itself.46 The district court concluded that the Terry
search of Day and the seizure of the gun were justified because the
pat-down was a necessary protective measure and the firearm was in
plain view. 47 The court also concluded, however, that the armed
security officers' subsequent actions, including custodial interrogation
without a Miranda warning and the retrieval of the marijuana
following an unproductive Terry search, warranted suppression.48 On
appeal, the Fourth Circuit reviewed Day's motion to suppress and
reversed the district court's finding that the armed security officers
were acting as government agents.49
II. THE "TWO PRIMARY FACTORS" TEST: THE DAY MAJORITY
The personal protections provided by the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments generally apply only to government conduct. 0 One way
this generalization fails is if a private party, "in light of all the
circumstances of the case, must be regarded as having acted as an
'instrument' or agent of the state."' Therefore, if the armed security
officers in Day were acting as government agents, they would be
subject to the procedural requirements of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments.52 Violation of these constitutional requirements could
44. Id. at 681-82.
45. See Brief of the Appellee at 2-3, Day, 591 F.3d 679 (No. 08-5231), 2009 WL
1390727.
46. Day, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 804.
47. Id. at 802-03.
48. Id. at 803--04.
49. Day, 591 F.3d at 681. On remand, Day pled guilty to unlawful possession of a
firearm by a controlled substance user. United States v. Day, No. 3:08CR403, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 53216, at *1 (E.D. Va. May 27, 2010) (finding Day "guilty of Count One of
the Indictment"); Indictment at 1, United States v. Day, 590 F. Supp. 2d 796 (E.D. Va.
2008) (No. 3:08CR403), 2008 WL 6564484 (describing count one as unlawfully possessing a
firearm "while being an unlawful user of a controlled substance").
50. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921); United States v. Garlock, 19
F.3d 441, 442 (8th Cir. 1994) ("[Tlhe constraints of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments do
not apply to purely private activity.") (citations omitted); United States v. Abney, No.
03CR60(JGK), 2003 WL 22047842, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2003).
51. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971) (citations omitted),
overruled on other grounds by Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990).
52. Cf Steven Euller, Private Security and the Exclusionary Rule, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 649, 649-51 (1980) (arguing for application of the exclusionary rule when private
[Vol. 891344
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result in suppression of the evidence they obtained." If suppressed,
the government would effectively be held accountable for the conduct
of the armed security officers, given the impact suppression would
have on the prosecution.54
To determine whether the armed security officers in Day were
acting as government agents, triggering the possibility of
suppression, the Day majority first identified two primary factors
necessary for establishing an agency relationship in this context: "(1)
'whether the Government knew of and acquiesced in the private'
individual's challenged conduct; and (2) 'whether the private
individual intended to assist law enforcement or had some other
independent motivation.' "56 The Day majority focused primarily on
the first factor and analyzed whether Virginia's regulation of armed
security officers satisfied this component of the test.57
In identifying agency, other courts have also applied the two-
factor test within a variety of situations, including private policing
contexts. For example, in State v. Santiago,59 a case factually similar
to Day,' the Supreme Court of New Mexico confirmed that the first
security officers violate the Constitution when investigating crimes and gathering evidence
for criminal prosecutions).
53. See id.
54. See Brief of the United States, supra note 30, at 43-44. Governmental
accountability would be justified if the government actually influenced the conduct of the
armed security officers because suppression would likely deter future violations. Cf Joh,
supra note 8, at 118 & n.325 (describing deterrence as the primary rationale for the
exclusionary rule). If the State exerts influence over the armed security officers, then the
threat of evidence exclusion would arguably trigger the State to modify its influence and
the resulting conduct of the armed security officers. Cf Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 488 (stating
that exclusion is designed " 'to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only
effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it.'" (quoting Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960))).
55. See supra note 14.
56. United States v. Day, 591 F.3d 679, 683 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v.
Jarrett, 338 F.3d 339, 344 (4th Cir. 2003)).
57. This Recent Development does not thoroughly examine the second element of the
two-factor test-the individual motivations of the armed security officers. The Day
majority recognized the crime-deterrence objective of the armed security officers, but also
noted that satisfaction of the second element of the test alone would not establish agency.
See id. at 686-87; see also State v. Santiago, 2009-NMSC-45, 26-27, 217 P.3d 89, 97
(requiring satisfaction of both prongs of the test).
58. See Santiago, 2009-NMSC-45, 17-18, 217 P.3d at 95; see also United States v.
Alexander, 447 F.3d 1290, 1295 (10th Cir. 2006) ("While [the two-factor test] has not been
explicitly adopted in the Fifth Amendment context, it is nonetheless instructive.").
59. 2009-NMSC-45, 217 P.3d 89.
60. In Santiago, private security guards at a shopping mall responded to a fight, at
which time they arrested and searched the defendant and discovered drugs that were later
turned over to the public police. Id. 1 2-3, 217 P.3d at 91-92. Furthermore, the Santiago
court concluded that the private security guards had not been delegated broad police
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factor of the two-factor agency test "requires that the state exercise a
degree of control over the private actors."6 ' Focusing on the Fourth
Amendment, the Santiago court stated that "[f]ederal courts consider
whether the private actor performed the search at the request of the
government, or whether the government otherwise initiated,
instigated, orchestrated, encouraged, or participated in the search."62
The Santiago court, in short, required more than mere
"awareness" of the security guards' actions.63 Santiago sought some
form of "active participation" by the government in the activities of
the private security guards.' The presence of a police substation on
the same commercial property, a shared radio frequency between the
police and the security guards, and knowledge that the security
guards routinely performed pat-down searches after detaining
suspects was insufficient evidence to satisfy the first factor. 65 The
Santiago court acknowledged, however, that if the public police
encouraged the security guards to perform evidentiary searches for
the State, or if the guards "routinely exceeded the permissible scope
of protective searches" that the public police condoned, participated
in, or did not discourage, then agency may result."
If measured by direct contact between armed security officers
and the State, Day provides less of a measurable relationship than
Santiago. Day contains no evidence of prior direct contact between
the armed security officers and the local public police authority,67 nor
is there any reference to a police substation at the Regency Lake
apartment complex, a shared radio frequency, or government
awareness of the armed security officers' routine practices.
The first factor of the agency test, however, may be established in
more ways than direct contact alone. Rejecting a simplistic
"knowledge plus acquiescence equals agency" standard in United
States v. Koening, the Seventh Circuit specifically looked to the
common law of agency in analyzing the two-factor test: "An agency
relationship 'results from the manifestation of consent by one person
powers. See id. 35, 217 P.3d at 99. Instead, the "security guards [we]re limited to the
lawful exercise of a common-law citizen's arrest." Id.
61. Id. 19, 217 P.3d at 95 (citing United States v. Shahid, 117 F.3d 322, 325 (7th Cir.
1997)).
62. Id. (citing United States v. Smythe, 84 F.3d 1240, 1243 (10th Cir. 1996)).
63. Id. 22, 217 P.3d at 96.
64. Id. 23, 217 P.3d at 96.
65. Id. 21, 217 P.3d at 96.
66. Id. 23, 217 P.3d at 96.
67. United States v. Day, 591 F.3d 679, 686 (4th Cir. 2010).
68. 856 F.2d 843 (7th Cir. 1988).
[Vol. 891346
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to another that the other shall act on his [or her] behalf and subject to
his [or her] control, and consent by the other so to act.' "69 Though
Koening cited this principle in determining that a formulaic inquiry is
inappropriate when applying the two-factor test," the opinion made
clear that control is a critical issue in identifying agency within this
context.
Though focused primarily on the private parties' motivation for
searching, Koening required evidence that government action
induced the private party's conduct.72 Particularly relevant to Day,
given that there appears to be no direct contact between state
authorities and the armed security officers,"7 Koening held "that legal
compulsion by statute, regulation, or executive order may provide the
control over private entities necessary to treat them as governmental
agents. "74
Under some circumstances a regulatory system may result in
governmental accountability for private-party conduct.75 In examining
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 6 the Day majority
acknowledged that the United States Supreme Court held the Fourth
Amendment applicable when a private railroad complied with
voluntary drug testing standards regulated by federal law. The
Supreme Court concluded that specific regulatory features indicated
that the government adopted more than " 'a passive position' "
regarding the drug testing performed by the private party."
Specifically, the regulatory system " 'removed all legal barriers to the
testing authorized by' the regulations, 'made plain [the
Government's] strong preference for testing,' and expressed the
Government's 'desire to share the fruits of such intrusions.' "79
Skinner demonstrates that the existence of agency is dependent on
69. Id. at 847 n.1 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958)); see also
Day, 591 F.3d at 683 (stating that identifying an agency relationship " 'is a fact-intensive
inquiry that is guided by common law agency principles.'" (quoting United States v.
Ellyson, 326 F.3d 522, 527 (4th Cir. 2003))).
70. See Koenig, 856 F.2d at 847 n.1.
71. See id. at 849-50.
72. Id. at 850 (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 488-89 (1971)).
73. See Day, 591 F.3d at 686.
74. Koenig, 856 F.2d at 850.
75. See Day, 591 F.3d at 685 n.6.
76. 489 U.S. 602 (1989); see also Day, 591 F.3d at 685 n.6 (discussing Skinner).
77. Day, 591 F.3d at 685 n.6 (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 614-15); see also United
States v. Jarrett, 338 F.3d 339, 344 (4th Cir. 2003) (discussing Skinner).
78. Day, 591 F.3d at 685 n.6 (quoting Skinner, 489 U.S. at 615).
79. Id. at 686 n.6 (quoting Skinner, 489 U.S. at 615).
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the scope of governmental involvement in the private party's
actions.80
In Day it is not apparent that Virginia's regulatory system goes
beyond a "passive position" regarding the armed security officers'
conduct, particularly with regard to their arrest of Day. For example,
title 9.1 of the Code of Virginia81 regulates private security services
businesses,' including armed security officers.8 ' Fundamental
provisions of the private security regulations subject security
providers to licensing and registration;' mandatory training
standards;" oversight by the Criminal Justice Services Board and the
Department of Criminal Justice Services;8 6 limitations on the power
of arrest;" and disciplinary action." Of critical importance to the Day
majority, the statute merely empowers armed security officers to
make "an arrest for an offense occurring . . . in [their] presence."89
Though both the district court and the Day dissent found sufficient
regulatory intrusions to satisfy the first element of the two-factor test,
80. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 614.
81. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 9.1-138 to -150 (2006). As noted in Day, armed security
officers are registered, trained, and subject to disciplinary action as a result of Virginia's
regulatory system. See Day, 591 F.3d at 684.
82. § 9.1-138 (defining "private security services businesses" to include security
officers, private investigators, alarm respondents, locksmiths, and other security service
providers).
83. Id. (" 'Armed security officer' means a natural person employed to (i) safeguard
and protect persons and property or (ii) deter theft, loss, or concealment of any tangible or
intangible personal property on the premises he is contracted to protect, and who carries
or has access to a firearm in the performance of his duties.").
84. § 9.1-139(A), (C), (E).
85. See § 9.1-139(F) (requiring minimum training standards and background checks);
see also supra note 12 (describing requirements under administrative regulations).
86. § 9.1-141 (defining the powers of the Criminal Justice Services Board, including
responsibility for establishing training requirements, qualifications, and examinations; fee
collection; and receipt of complaints, investigations, and disciplinary action); § 9.1-142
(defining the powers of the Department of Criminal Justice Services, including the ability
to issue subpoenas for the investigation of complaints, "[i]nstitute proceedings to enjoin
any person from engaging in any lawful act," and establishing a duty to turn over evidence
of criminal acts to law enforcement officers).
87. § 9.1-146 ("A registered armed security officer ... while at a location which the
business is contracted to protect shall have the power to effect an arrest for an offense
occurring (i) in his presence on such premises or (ii) in the presence of a merchant, agent,
or employee of the merchant the private security business has contracted to protect, if the
merchant, agent, or employee had probable cause to believe that the person arrested had
shoplifted or committed willful concealment of goods .... For the purposes of [issuance
and service of summons in place of a warrant in a misdemeanor case], a registered armed
security officer ... shall be considered an arresting officer.").
88. See §§ 9.1-147 to -150.
89. § 9.1-146; see United States v. Day, 591 F.3d 679, 688-89 (4th Cir. 2010).
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regarding knowledge and acquiescence,"o the Day majority rejected
this conclusion.91
Day requires something more than government regulation in
order to establish an agency relationship.' In short, the Day majority
requires evidence that the government participated in or affirmatively
encouraged the private parties' conduct. In citing United States v.
Shahid,94 a Seventh Circuit case, the Day majority acknowledged that
when the government knows of and acquiesces in a private party's
conduct, "the private party would expect some benefit (e.g., receiving
a reward from the government) from taking the action, or expect
some detriment (e.g., getting in trouble with government authorities)
from not acting."" There was no evidence that the armed security
officers in Day were to receive a reward or compensation for their
actions, nor were they subject to regulatory discipline for failing to
act. 96 In short, the Day majority required some evidence of control-
proof of the government's intent to either directly or indirectly
influence the conduct of the armed security officers.97 In Day, control,
90. See Day, 591 F.3d at 694 n.5 (Davis, J., dissenting in part) (arguing that Virginia's
regulatory framework "cloaks these guards with a comprehensive imprimatur of state
authority," including licensing standards, arrest and search powers, and status as "arresting
officers"); United States v. Day, 590 F. Supp. 2d 796, 801-02 (E.D. Va. 2008) ("[Virginia]
affirmatively encouraged and enabled these officers to engage in the complained of
conduct."), rev'd, 591 F.3d 679 (4th Cir. 2010). The Day dissent also argues that
"[a]lthough the Commonwealth [of Virginia] may not have advance knowledge of every
individual arrest and search undertaken by a private security guard, the same is true of its
sworn law enforcement officers." Day, 591 F.3d at 694 n.5 (Davis, J., dissenting in part).
However, the Day dissent does not account for a public officer's legal duty to arrest in
appropriate circumstances. See Yeatts v. Minton, 177 S.E.2d 646, 648 (Va. 1970) (citing
Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Haun, 187 S.E. 481, 484 (Va. 1936)); see also United States v.
Lima, 424 A.2d 113, 120 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (distinguishing a citizen's lack of duty to arrest
relative to a public police officer who would be subject to criminal liability or a fine for
failing to arrest for an offense committed in his presence).
91. See Day, 591 F.3d at 685-86.
92. See id. at 685.
93. See id.
94. 117 F.3d 322 (7th Cir. 1997).
95. Id. at 327 (citing United States v. Feffer, 831 F.2d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1987)); see,
e.g., United States v. Ginglen, 467 F.3d 1071, 1075 (7th Cir. 2006) (stating that the private
parties "did not act to obtain a reward" in searching their father's home and notifying
police).
96. See Day, 591 F.3d at 685-86.
97. State v. Madsen, 2009 SD 5, 760 N.W.2d 370, represents an interesting example of
a case where sufficient governmental involvement existed to support a finding of agency
within the private policing context. In Madsen, the defendant was convicted for various
drug-related crimes based on evidence obtained by security guards at the Royal River
Casino Hotel in Flandreau, South Dakota. Id. 1$ 1-3, 760 N.W.2d at 371-72. The hotel
was owned by the Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe. Id. 3, 760 N.W.2d at 372. It is
important to note that the trial record did not clearly define "whether the Tribe itself
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or even compulsion, is not present under Virginia's regulatory scheme
given that the Fourth Circuit correctly characterized the armed
security officers' actions as regulated, but permissive, conduct." In
comparison to the regulatory scheme applicable in Skinner, it is not
clear that Virginia's regulatory framework has removed all barriers to
an armed security officer's action" or created any preference for
armed security officer action or inaction.
Moreover, within the Day context, the case-by-case, fact-
intensive inquiry required by the two-factor test is a practical
approach when considering suppression for at least two reasons: (1)
suppression, through the use of the exclusionary rule, should be
applied cautiously,'" and (2) it is not clear that the suppression of
evidence would deter all private police."o' At a minimum, the
operate[d] the casino and hotel, or whether it maintain[ed] an operating contract with a
third party." Id. 1 3 n.1, 760 N.W.2d at 372 n.1. In overturning the lower court's denial of
the defendant's motion to suppress, the Madsen court relied heavily on a Ninth Circuit
agency test analogous to the two-factor test applied in Day. See id. 29, 760 N.W.2d at
380. Important factors in establishing control for the Madsen court-despite the failure to
clearly show direct management of the facility-were the tribal government's hiring of
tribal members for security positions in both the casino and hotel, id. I9 3, 24, 760 N.W.2d
at 372, 378, and the tribe's designation of policies and procedures governing the security
guards' behavior associated with the lawful operation of the facility under the Indian
Gaming Regulations, id. 24, 760 N.W.2d at 378. In sum, the Madsen court held that the
security guards were "government actors" whose activities were subject to the
exclusionary rule. See id. 31, 760 N.W.2d at 381.
98. See Day, 591 F.3d at 685-86. Even in Virginia, however, instances will occur when
government control does exist, requiring case-by-case consideration of the facts and
potential suppression of evidence. See generally Amy Goldstein, The Private Arm of the
Law, WASH. POST, Jan. 2, 2007, at A4 (describing the Virginia Department of Criminal
Justice Services' development of closer ties between security companies and public
police).
99. For example, in the case of arrest, an armed security officer's authority is limited
by statute, see supra note 87, thus placing a fundamental restriction on the power of an
armed security officer to act in many situations. See infra notes 124-25 and accompanying
text.
100. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 459 (1976) (stating that when applying the
exclusionary rule "[t]here comes a point at which courts, consistent with their duty to
administer the law, cannot continue to create barriers to law enforcement in the pursuit of
a supervisory role that is properly the duty of the Executive and Legislative Branches"). In
Janis, the Supreme Court "conclude[d] that exclusion from federal civil proceedings of
evidence unlawfully seized by a state criminal enforcement officer has not been shown to
have a sufficient likelihood of deterring the conduct of the state police so that it outweighs
the societal costs imposed by the exclusion." Id. at 454; see also Sklansky, supra note 4, at
1267-68 ("The Supreme Court has instructed that the exclusionary rule should apply only
when its incremental value in deterring constitutional violations outweighs its cost for
'truth-finding' and law enforcement.").
101. Compare United States v. Francouer, 547 F.2d 891, 894 (5th Cir. 1977) (arguing
against the extension of the exclusionary rule to Disney World security officers), and Joh,
supra note 8, at 118-20 (describing the ineffectiveness of suppression in a hypothetical
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effectiveness of suppression as a motivator may be limited;10
consequently, its extension has been restricted in various contexts,
including situations where direct government violation of
constitutional rights did not result in the application of the
exclusionary rule."o3 The apparent diminished deterrent effect of
suppression in many private policing contexts is not a component of
private policing example), and Simmons, supra note 4, at 931 (arguing that the incentive
system upon which the Fourth and Fifth Amendments are based (i.e., exclusion of
evidence) is ineffective within the private policing context), with State v. Keyser, 369 A.2d
224, 225 (N.H. 1977) (arguing that the exclusionary rule may be effective in certain private
policing contexts), and Sklansky, supra note 4, at 1268-69 (arguing that it is unclear what
impact the exclusionary rule has on private police), and Sean James Beaton, Comment,
Counterparts in Modern Policing: The Influence of Corporate Investigators on the Public
Police and a Call for the Broadening of the State Action Doctrine, 26 TOURO L. REV. 593,
599-603 (2010) (describing specific instances where private police have a significant
interest in criminal prosecution).
102. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1.8(a), at 258 (4th ed. 2004)
(describing the ineffectiveness of exclusion on a private searcher); see also Janis, 428 U.S.
at 459 ("In the past this Court has opted for exclusion in the anticipation that law
enforcement officers would be deterred from violating Fourth Amendment rights. Then,
as now, the Court acted in the absence of convincing empirical evidence and relied,
instead, on its own assumptions of human nature and the interrelationship of the various
components of the law enforcement system."). For further consideration of LaFave's
arguments and the complications associated with the often mixed motivations of private
police, see Sklansky, supra note 4, at 1268-69.
103. See Janis, 428 U.S. at 434, 454 (holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to
unconstitutionally seized evidence by a state law enforcement officer, making it admissible
in a civil proceeding by the United States); LAFAVE, supra note 102, § 1.8(d), at 295-98;
Euller, supra note 52, at 672 n.83. Generally speaking, "exclusion can be an effective
deterrent only if two conditions are met: (i) 'the searcher must have a strong interest in
obtaining convictions'; and (ii) 'the searcher must commit searches and seizures regularly
in order to be familiar enough with the rules to adapt his methods to conform to them.' "
LAFAVE, supra note 102, § 1.8(d), at 291 (footnote omitted). Regarding the former
requirement, a strong argument can be made that many private police, including the
armed security officers in Day, are primarily motivated to prevent or detect crime, not
investigate it for potential prosecution. See, e.g., Brief of the United States, supra note 30,
at 8-9 (describing policies of the armed security officers' employer, American Security
Group). Regarding the latter requirement, however, private police in many instances are
"'repeat players' who possess incentives to use legal rules strategically." Joh, supra note 8,
at 112. In contrast, it has also been argued that "[g]uards seldom investigate, interrogate,
make investigative searches, or arrest suspects." Euller, supra note 52, at 682. But see
Sklansky, supra note 4, at 1179 ("[Tjhe security industry as a whole probably carries out
significantly more stops, searches, and interrogations than is often imagined.").
Ultimately, the frequency of searches and interrogations likely relates to the individual
private police officer's duties and job responsibilities. See Sklansky, supra note 4, at 1179;
see also supra note 20 (describing instances in which private police are off-duty police
officers or have been deputized). Nevertheless, it is possible that any increased interest in
prosecution would result in agency and the increased effectiveness of suppression as a
deterrent. Cf Boghosian, supra note 8, at 202-03 (describing an increasing interest in
criminal prosecution in the private policing sector and the cooperative relationships that
are developing with public policing entities).
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the two-factor test analysis, yet it does provide invaluable context for
understanding the practical effectiveness of any sanction resulting
from a finding of agency or state action within a criminal
proceeding.'" This is particularly true in Day, where it is not clear
that a desire to achieve a successful prosecution motivated the armed
security officers.'o
III. THE PUBLIC FUNCTION TEST: THE DAY DISSENT
The Supreme Court considers the suppression of evidence an
effective sanction in deterring public police from violating
constitutional protections.'" As a result, evidence improperly
acquired by public police may be subject to suppression.10 7 Similarly,
if the armed security officers in Day were shown to be "de facto
police," the evidence they obtained would also be subject to
suppression.108 The Day majority, therefore, considered whether the
armed security officers acted as de facto police under the public
function test, which would potentially qualify them as state agents or
actors.' 09
Under the public function test, "[a] private entity may be deemed
a state actor ... if it performs functions that are 'traditionally the
exclusive prerogative of the State.' ".0 The police function and the
104. Cf Joh, supra note 4, at 616 (arguing that the expansion of the state action
doctrine may be appropriate when private police place more emphasis on pursuing
prosecution; however, when this is not the case, any subsequent expansion may have no
effect).
105. Cf United States v. Day, 591 F.3d 679, 686 (4th Cir. 2010) (arguing that the
private officers' "objective of 'deterring crime' is entirely consistent with [their]
responsibility to protect the tenants and property of the Regency Lake apartment
complex, irrespective of any simultaneous goal of assisting law enforcement").
106. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1968).
107. See id.
108. See United States v. Day, 590 F. Supp. 2d 796, 800-04 (E.D. Va. 2008) (" 'Where
private security guards are endowed by law with plenary police powers such that they are
de facto police officers, they may qualify as state actors under the public function test.' "
(quoting Romanski v. Detroit Entm't, L.L.C., 428 F.3d 629, 637 (2005))), rev'd, 591 F.3d
679 (4th Cir. 2010).
109. See Day, 591 F.3d at 687-89.
110. Wade v. Byles, 83 F.3d 902, 905 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison
Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974)). The Day majority makes clear that "the 'public function'
test [is] typically utilized for assessing a private party's susceptibility to a civil rights suit
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Day, 591 F.3d at 687; see also State v. Santiago, 2009-NMSC-045,
1 31, 217 P.3d 89, 98 (finding that the public function test has only been applied in a
limited number of jurisdictions in the context of the Fourth Amendment). Interestingly,
the primary cases examined by the Day dissent were civil actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
See Day, 591 F.3d at 689-92 (Davis, J., dissenting in part). Given that the ultimate sanction
in Day is suppression, a cost imposed on the government, see Brief of the United States,
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associated authority to arrest have been identified by courts as
" 'basic functions of government.' "I" Unfortunately, a significant
challenge exists when applying the public function test within this
context because even though policing may be identified as a basic
function of government, this designation appears to have little
bearing on its status as a power reserved "traditionally" and
"exclusively" for government."2
The Day majority assumed that even if "plenary arrest authority
alone could transform a private individual into a state actor, [the
armed security officers] did not possess the same power to make
warrantless arrests afforded to Virginia police officers."113 A public
police officer's broad authority "to 'arrest, without a warrant, any
person who commits any crime in the presence of the officer and any
person whom he has reasonable grounds or probable cause to suspect
supra note 30, at 43-44, not the armed security officers, it is necessary to consider the
fundamental distinction between the two-factor test and the public function test. As stated
by the Santiago court:
Whereas the agency test looks at the relationship between the private actor and
the government, "[t]he public function strand of state action theory states that
when a private citizen performs tasks and exercises powers that are traditionally
governmental in nature, he will be treated as a government actor. He will be
subject to the same restrictions as the government, even in the absence of direct
contact between him and a government official or agency."
Santiago, 2009-NMSC-045, 29, 217 P.3d at 98 (quoting Euller, supra note 52, at 657).
This distinction highlights an underlying discomfort some courts may have in effectively
punishing the government through the suppression of evidence as a result of a private
individual's actions without clear government involvement. See id. $ 36-37, 217 P.3d at
100. This is particularly true when the sanction itself may have no impact on the future
conduct of the private actor, see supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text, or when the
government has not delegated plenary police powers to the private actor, see Santiago,
2009-NMSC-045, 1 33-37, 217 P.3d at 99-100.
111. Rodriquez v. Smithfield Packing Co., 338 F.3d 348, 355 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting
Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 297-98 (1978)); see also Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S.
149, 163 (1978) (describing "police protection" as an activity that has "been administered
with a greater degree of exclusivity by States and municipalities" relative to other
activities); Day, 591 F.3d at 688 (discussing Rodriquez).
112. See Sklansky, supra note 4, at 1253-62 (discussing, among other things, the
uncertainty created by the United States Supreme Court's statements regarding the status
of "police protection" as a public function in Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978));
see also Beaton, supra note 101, at 607-08 (discussing the issues associated with applying
the public function test within the private policing context). For an extensive discussion of
the more recent complexities associated with the United States Supreme Court's public
function doctrine, see G. Sidney Buchanan, A Conceptual History of the State Action
Doctrine: The Search for Governmental Responsibility, 34 Hous. L. REV. 333, 379-90
(1997).
113. Day, 591 F.3d at 688-89.
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of having committed a felony not in his presence' "114 is not an
"insignificant" detail when determining whether a government has
delegated plenary arrest power to a private party."' A public police
officer's comprehensive arrest power represents a true plenary police
power, while armed security officers are " 'permitted to exercise only
what [a]re in effect citizens' arrests.' "116 The Day dissent, however,
disagreed with this conclusion.117
Applying the public function test, the Day dissent concluded that
the armed security officers possessed extensive police powers, most
notably "generous arrest authority," were subject to extensive
regulation, and were therefore state actors. 18 Consequently, the Day
dissent would have required the armed security officers to comply
with the same constitutional standards as public police. 119
Interestingly, the degree of arrest authority exercised by or
granted to private police plays a crucial role in state action analysis.120
In Lindsey v. Detroit Entertainment, LLC,12' for example, casino
security guards that detained suspected slot machine thieves did not
exercise an identifiable police power, like misdemeanor arrest
authority,22 but rather a power possessed by ordinary citizens
114. Id. at 688 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-81 (2008)).
115. Compare id. at 693 (Davis, J., dissenting in part) (describing the difference in
scope of arrest as "sufficiently insignificant to declare that Virginia guards possess
authority akin to plenary authority" (citing Romanski v. Detroit Entm't, L.L.C., 428 F.3d
629, 638 n.3 (6th Cir. 2005)), with id. at 688-89 (majority opinion) (arguing that the scope
of arrest is more limited).
116. Id. at 689 (majority opinion) (quoting Romanski v. Detroit Entm't, L.L.C., 428
F.3d 629, 639 (6th Cir. 2005)).
117. See id. at 692-93 (Davis, J., dissenting in part).
118. See id. at 690-93. The focus in this section will be based primarily on the scope of
arrest power given that the general regulatory framework has already been explored in
detail. See supra Part II.
119. See Day, 591 F.3d at 693 (Davis, J., dissenting in part).
120. See Joh, supra note 8, at 92. In general, the doctrine of state action and its
application to private police have challenged the courts. Id. at 95 (noting, however, that
"[miuch ... scholarship takes the view that the state action doctrine, if carefully applied,
would qualify private police as state actors"). Challenges persist because state action
doctrine, as it applies to the police function, is rarely litigated, resulting in very little case
law available for distinguishing private from public within the policing context. See id. at
94. As a result, courts generally rely on the presence or absence of official title, see
Sklansky, supra note 4, at 1246, like deputization, see supra note 20. Accordingly, "courts
have been more concerned with the line distinguishing public police from all other people,
rather than with private police as a separate category warranting distinct legal status." Joh,
supra note 8, at 95. Unfortunately, the risk of broadly applied state action is a loss of
meaning for this doctrine, creating an environment in which almost all private activity
results in state action. See Sklansky, supra note 4, at 1250, 1261-62.
121. 484 F.3d 824 (6th Cir. 2007).
122. See id. at 829. In Lindsey, the security personnel were not licensed under Michigan
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comparable to the common law shopkeeper's privilege.123 This
distinction is crucial-although Virginia defines an armed security
officer's arrest authority, this does not independently create a grant of
plenary police powers. 124 Virginia has instead instituted a narrow
regulatory system that allows an armed security officer to exercise the
equivalent of a citizen's privilege of arrest.125
In contrast, in both Romanski v. Detroit Entertainment, L.L. C.126
and Payton v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center,127 on
which the Day dissent relied,12 states delegated plenary police powers
comparable to public police officers to the security guards in
question.2 9 In Romanski, the State delegated " 'the authority to arrest
a person without a warrant as set forth for public peace officers.' "130
In Payton, in which the security personnel were licensed as "special
Chicago police officers,"'31 the Seventh Circuit concluded that "no
legal difference exist[ed] between a privately employed special officer
with full police powers and a regular Chicago police officer. "132
In Day, however, the armed security officers were subject to
more extensive limitations on their ability to execute an arrest.
Though they were capable of making "an arrest for any offense
occurring in their presence while on the premises they guard, and
even for some (primarily shop-lifting-related) offenses not occurring
law; therefore, they did not have misdemeanor arrest authority. Id. The importance of
licensure and the arrest authority it granted were critical issues in the court's holding. Id.
at 829-31.
123. See id. at 831 (citing Chapman v. Higbee Co., 319 F.3d 825, 834 (6th Cir. 2003)).
The common law shopkeeper's privilege allows a merchant to detain a suspected
shoplifter if the merchant believes that the individual did in fact steal store property.
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 22, at 141-42 (W. Page Keeton et al.
eds., 5th ed. 1984). In Virginia, this privilege is codified in VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-226.9
(2007).
124. See Day, 591 F.3d at 688-89.
125. See id. A citizen may arrest for an offense of the peace committed in his presence,
including misdemeanors and felonies. See Hudson v. Commonwealth, 585 S.E.2d 583, 588
(Va. 2003). For a more detailed discussion of citizen's arrest at common law generally, see
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CITIZEN'S ARREST: THE LAW OF ARREST, SEARCH, AND
SEIZURE FOR PRIVATE CITIZENS AND PRIVATE POLICE 9-13 (1977).
126. 428 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2005).
127. 184 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 1999).
128. See Day, 591 F.3d at 691-92 (Davis, J., dissenting in part).
129. See Romanski, 428 F.3d at 637-38; Payton, 184 F.3d at 630. In both cases, the
private actors were licensed. Romanski, 428 F.3d at 638; Payton, 184 F.3d at 624-25.
130. Romanski, 428 F.3d at 638 (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 338.1080 (West
2004)).
131. Payton, 184 F.3d at 624.
132. Id. at 630.
2011] 1355
1356 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89
in their presence, this power is not substantially different from the
general public's power of arrest.134 The latter grant is arguably the
most significant extension of power, yet it only applies to shoplifting
offenses or the willful concealment of goods committed "in the
presence of a merchant, agent, or employee of the merchant the
private security business has contracted to protect." 13  In effect, the
Virginia statute allows the transfer of the shopkeeper's privilege from
business owners to their armed security officers, which may be a
pragmatic safety consideration given the inherent risks associated
with confronting a suspected thief.'36
133. Day, 591 F.3d at 692 (Davis, J., dissenting in part) (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1-
146 (2006)).
134. See Day, 591 F.3d at 688-89; see also NEMETH, supra note 3, at 70-79 (describing
citizen's arrest and the reality that private police generally possess "no more formal
authority than an average citizen"); supra note 125 and accompanying text (describing
citizen's arrest). In contrast, it may be argued that little difference exists between the
arrest authority of private individuals and public police officers, see Sklansky, supra note 4,
at 1184-87; however, this conclusion would seemingly result in government acquiescence
amounting to state action within the context of citizen's arrest, see id. at 1250. This type of
conclusion would stretch the boundaries of state action doctrine. See id at 1250; supra
note 120.
135. VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1-146 (2006). The dissent does point out that "there are ...
circumstances when the law requires that private security guards be deemed 'arresting
officers.'" Day, 591 F.3d at 692 (Davis, J., dissenting in part) (citing VA. CODE ANN.
§ 9.1-146 (2006)). The dissent also notes that private individuals conducting citizen's
arrests are not considered "arresting officers." Id. at 693 n.3. This grant to armed security
officers exists so that a summons may be issued, see VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-74 (2008),
which is arguably a practical policy decision that allows an armed security officer to avoid
the need to arrest and detain an individual, see supra note 42 (stating that the decision to
arrest Day as opposed to issuing him a summons was made by a public police officer). This
judgment is practical in the sense that it acknowledges an armed security officer's greater
likelihood of executing an arrest relative to an ordinary citizen and the need for an
efficient mechanism to process the individuals she encounters. Cf Joh, supra note 8, at 64
("[P]rivate police are occupationally disposed to use powers that a citizen may rarely, if
ever, invoke."). The dissent's citation of Coston v. Commonwealth, 512 S.E.2d 158 (Va. Ct.
App. 1999), in which the Court of Appeals of Virginia recognized a registered security
officer issuing a summons as a "'public officer or public employee,' " see Day, 591 F.3d at
695 n.6 (Davis, J., dissenting in part) (quoting Coston, 512 S.E.2d at 159-60), is
distinguishable. The Coston court limited its holding to the issue of whether the defendant
could be convicted for the forgery of a public document-the summons. Coston, 512
S.E.2d at 159-60. Coston made clear that this decision had no application within the
Fourth or Fifth Amendment context. Id. at 160 (citations omitted). The Day majority even
noted that the Coston court recognized " '[tihe general rule' that 'a private security officer'
is not 'a public officer or public employee.' " Day, 591 F.3d at 689 n.10 (quoting Coston,
512 S.E.2d at 160).
136. It could also be argued that this is merely a recognition of an "entity's basic right
to protect persons and property" through a conscious delegation to private police
personnel. See NEMETH, supra note 3, at 70.
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The Day dissent largely equated the scope of arrest delineated in
Virginia's regulatory scheme to a public police officer's authority;m13
however, if Virginia had delegated a public function to armed security
officers sufficient to constitute state action, the State would
effectively be left with two options. In short, the State could "(1)
withdraw the delegation, or (2) compel the private actor to conform
its actions to the requirements of the Constitution as they apply to
governmental action." 138 Unfortunately, neither option would likely
produce a favorable outcome within this context.'39
IV. REGULATING PRIVATE POLICE AFTER DAY
After Day, many observers may feel that there is little hope of
regulating the behavior of private police.14 First, statutory regulation
is minimal in many jurisdictions14 ' and the effectiveness of civil and/or
137. See Day, 591 F.3d at 692-93 (Davis, J., dissenting in part).
138. Buchanan, supra note 112, at 345.
139. Withdrawing the delegation, specifically arrest as it is defined in section 9.1-146,
would not likely resolve the concerns of the Day dissent because the armed security
officers could still exercise citizen's arrest or simply take action without regard to any legal
justification. In contrast, the extension of constitutional restrictions to armed security
officers would fundamentally redefine the methods by which armed security officers
provide security services in Virginia. Interestingly, an armed security officer's employer
may only be concerned about providing affordable residential security, see Sklansky, supra
note 4, at 1223 (describing landowner liability for property security), yet the outcome
advocated by the Day dissent would require the employer to ensure that those services
were provided in a constitutionally legitimate manner subject to the constraints of the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments. See Day, 591 F.3d at 693 (Davis, J., dissenting in part).
Presumably, this result would impact the economic viability of the private security option.
Brief of the United States, supra note 30, at 46; see Sklansky, supra note 4, at 1222-23
(describing patrols as labor-intensive activities requiring low-wage employees). For
example, armed security guards would not benefit from a qualified immunity defense for
civil rights suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, potentially subjecting them to greater liability
than similarly situated public police officers. Brief of the United States, supra note 30, at
43. The end result would be to impact the individual liberty of the employer and create
government responsibility where it may not be warranted. Cf Lugar v. Edmondson Oil
Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936-37 (1982) ("Careful adherence to the 'state action' requirement
preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and federal
judicial power. It also avoids imposing on the State, its agencies or officials, responsibility
for conduct for which they cannot fairly be blamed.").
140. In the short-term, the recommendations outlined in this section will not address
the dilemma faced by Day-his apparent belief that the armed security officers who
confronted him did in fact have authority to search and interrogate him following their
initial confrontation. There seems to be no viable means for addressing this specific
situation given that it warranted the officers' initial intervention. In fact, the armed
security officers may have done Day a great service by intervening. The escalation of
events that evening could have easily resulted in two more unfortunate outcomes: Day
committing murder or being killed himself. Cf Brief of the United States, supra note 30, at
13, 53 (noting that the armed security officers' "presence calmed the situation").
141. See supra note 28.
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criminal liability is uncertain.142 Second, the constitutional constraints
associated with the Fourth and Fifth Amendments are generally
inapplicable to the private police sector.143 Unlike a finding of state
action under the public function test, which would have likely
required a revocation of the delegation or compliance with criminal
procedure,1" the two-factor test employed by the Day majority
preserves the existing regulatory framework instituted by the State of
Virginia. As a result, Virginia may adapt its current regulatory
framework to address some of the more fundamental concerns
associated with the private policing industry.145
The following are recommendations that recognize the strengths
of Virginia's current security industry regulations and areas where
modifications could be made.146 These recommendations encourage
increased information collection regarding the activities of the private
police industry and the viability of civil actions and criminal sanctions
as regulating forces. While these recommendations focus on
Virginia's regulatory framework, they are generally applicable to any
jurisdiction interested in reconsidering its own regulatory approach.
142. See supra note 28.
143. See supra notes 20, 50 and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
145. See Simmons, supra note 4, at 931-32; see also NEMETH, supra note 3, at 22-23
(describing heightened interest in private police regulation by "state legislatures, federal
authorities, and even local governing bodies"). But see Simmons, supra note 4, at 931 n.86
(stating that "very little political pressure" exists to expand "state regulation of private
security guards"); Sklansky, supra note 4, at 1272 ("Legislators have shown little interest
in reforming the rules governing the private police, or even in collecting basic information
about their operations."). General change could result, however, if private police
misconduct resulted in public outrage or heightened visibility. See NEMETH, supra note 3,
at 24, 32. The events of Day, or analogous situations, may not trigger new regulation, but
other bad activity may make change more viable. See generally Lourdes Medrano Leslie &
Curt Brown, Guard Could Face Criminal Charges in Teen's Shooting, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), Nov. 4, 2003, at 1B (describing the shooting of a sixteen-year-old boy who
was suspected of stealing a car radio by a residential security guard); Rene Stutzman,
Guard to Plead in Teen's Death, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 17, 2006, at B3 (describing the
shooting of a sixteen-year-old by two apartment complex security guards); Mike Tolson &
Mike Glenn, Security Guard Who Shot Man Jailed, Charged with Murder, HOUS. CHRON.,
May 28, 2010, at Al (describing the shooting of a twenty-year-old by a security guard
employed by Top Gun Security & Investigations, a company that had been in business for
only four months); Hooters Sued Over Alleged Attack on Grandmother, CBS NEWS.COM
(Nov. 19, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/11/19/national/main707O9O4.shtml
(describing a security guard who headlocked a grandmother as a result of a confrontation
over a disputed bill).
146. For a somewhat comparable, but dated, approach to private police regulation, see
Mark L. Webb et al., Private Police in California: A Legislative Proposal, 5 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 115, 137-40 (1974) (arguing for comprehensive legislation of the private
police industry in California through adaption of existing regulatory tools).
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A. Information Collection
Governments should commission empirical studies describing the
activities and behaviors of private police in order to better understand
and effectively regulate the private police industry."7 Particular focus
should be placed on accurately comparing and contrasting the
similarities and differences between private and public police. 148
Obtaining the data needed to perform these studies, however, can be
difficult given the secrecy associated with this industry.'49
In order to obtain this data, Professor David A. Sklansky
recommends that states should require private police entities to "file
regular, public reports on their activities, with due regard for
legitimate privacy interests."' States could require private police
entities to provide information regarding "the number of people they
accost and detain, when and how those individuals are questioned,
how many suspects are turned over to the police, the number and
type of searches conducted by private security personnel, or the
circumstances and results of those searches.""'
Virginia's current regulatory framework provides a foundation
for pursuing this objective. First, Virginia requires each licensed
private security services business to designate a compliance agent 5 2
for the organization.15' State regulations require compliance agents to
possess a minimum of three years of experience in the private security
services business (or a related field) and ensure an entity's
compliance with the private security services businesses legislation.'54
The private security regulations assign compliance agents a
variety of responsibilities, including "[e]nsur[ing] that the licensee
and all employees regulated ... conform to all application
requirements, administrative requirements and standards of
conduct.""55  Furthermore, administrative regulations require
147. See Sklansky, supra note 4, at 1278.
148. See id. (describing the need to know "more about how the day-to-day activities of
private guards differ from those of the public police" in order to better assess potential
reforms).
149. Id.
150. Id.; cf Enion, supra note 4, at 520 ("[P]ublic disclosure requirements do not apply
to 'private' entities.").
151. Sklansky, supra note 4, at 1279.
152. VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1-138 (2006) (defining "compliance agent" as "an individual
who owns or is employed by a licensed private security services business to ensure the
compliance of the private security services business with this title").
153. Id. § 9.1-139(A).
154. Id.
155. 6 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 20-171-240(10)(a) (2010).
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compliance agents to "[m]aintain documentation for all employees
... that verifies compliance with requirements pursuant to the Code
of Virginia."' 56 State law requires the maintenance of these records in
part to ensure their availability for inspection by Virginia's
administrative oversight body."
Second, the private security services businesses administrative
regulations currently require a licensee to report "any incident in
which any registrant has discharged a firearm while on duty." 5 8
Taken together, Virginia's relevant statutes and regulations provide
the basic elements needed to effectively gather empirical evidence
regarding the behavior of private police: (1) an oversight body, (2) an
organizational compliance agent, and (3) a model notification
requirement. Compliance agents could be used to periodically report
specific data regarding the number of times security personnel place
individuals in constraints, perform searches, remove individuals to
private interrogation rooms, or turn over evidence to public law
enforcement entities.' Collection of this data would provide a better
understanding of the private police industry in Virginia and could be
used to develop more targeted legislation in the future.'60
B. Encourage Civil Action and Increase Criminal Punishments
The suppression of evidence in criminal prosecutions may not
encourage a significant number of private police to comply with the
privacy and personal autonomy objectives of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments.6 1 In many situations, including the circumstances in
Day, suppression will not incentivize private police to the same extent
as their public police counterparts given that successful criminal
prosecutions may not be their primary objective.16 1 In fact, private
police may wish to avoid prosecutions and the organizational costs
associated with participating in criminal proceedings altogether. 163
156. § 20-171-240(10)(b).
157. 6 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 20-171-220(1) (2010).
158. § 20-171-220(15).
159. See Sklansky, supra note 4, at 1279.
160. See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 4, at 981 (describing the need for empirical study
regarding how adequately tort actions deter private police misconduct). Professor Ric
Simmons argues that empirical evidence could provide a basis for modifying the tort
system to adequately deter misconduct, including "lower[ing] the barriers to bringing suit,
or increas[ing] the punitive damages available once mistreatment has been proven." Id.
161. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
163. See Joh, supra note 8, at 122; Simmons, supra note 4, at 938, 961.
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Individual private police misconduct, in contrast, may be directly
subject to civil and criminal liability." Specifically, misconduct may
result in liability for trespass, false imprisonment, and assault.165 A
theory supporting the effectiveness of tort liability, for example, is
that successful claims will encourage more desirable behavior given
the associated costs of misconduct.166 One may argue that violations
of constitutional protections will not frequently produce viable tort
liability claims; however, even limited success may have a positive
incremental effect on private police behavior.67
Though the effectiveness of civil and criminal liability in this
context may be minimal, or at least uncertain,68 it does allow for a
private police officer to be held personally liable for certain forms of
misconduct.169 Subjecting an armed security officer to civil and
criminal liability links the misconduct and accountability more closely
than the suppression of evidence.'70 A robust tort and criminal
liability system represents a more viable incentive mechanism for
encouraging private police to respect personal privacy and individual
autonomy.'
Virginia has already instituted a number of regulatory provisions
that provide a foundation for achieving and maintaining a dynamic
tort and criminal liability system. First, Virginia law establishes an
oversight body that is responsible for receiving complaints and
conducting investigations regarding violations committed by private
164. See, e.g., Sklansky, supra note 4, at 1183. In Virginia, registered or licensed
security entities or personnel are subject to administrative discipline, including loss of
registration or licensure, probation, fines, and remedial training. See 6 VA. ADMIN. CODE
§ 20-171-500 (2010).
165. See Sklansky, supra note 4, at 1183 ("Unless the owner has given consent, a
security guard's search of private property will generally constitute a trespass. And arrests
or detentions not authorized by state law generally will expose a security guard to civil and
criminal liability for false imprisonment and, if force is involved, for assault.").
166. Cf Miller & Wright, supra note 28, at 781 (discussing tort judgments and their
impact on public police behavior). Interestingly, it is at least arguable that civil liability
may have even greater impact on private conduct relative to government activity. See id.
167. See id. at 772-73 (referencing Fourth Amendment tort liability claims).
168. See Sklansky, supra note 4, at 1185-86. But see Simmons, supra note 4, at 979-81
(arguing that the tort system is an effective regulatory device for private police).
169. Cf Simmons, supra note 4, at 980 (stating that private police do not benefit from
qualified or sovereign immunity); Sklansky, supra note 4, at 1186 (stating that public
police, acting in good faith, "generally are immunized from tort or criminal liability"). It
should be noted that civil action against public police officers may be more attractive given
that "suits alleging constitutional violations by officers acting 'under color of state law' can
proceed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which entitles victorious plaintiffs to recover not only
damages but attorneys' fees as well." Sklansky, supra note 4, at 1186-87.
170. See Simmons, supra note 4, at 980-81.
171. See id. at 981.
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police. 7 2 More importantly, the private security services businesses
regulations require that any "[i]nformation concerning alleged
criminal violations shall be turned over to law-enforcement officers in
appropriate jurisdictions.""' Second, it is "unlawful for any person to
... [v]iolate any statute or regulation governing the practice of the
private security services businesses."174 Conviction for a willful
violation of this provision constitutes a class 1 misdemeanor."' As a
result, an armed security officer could face a maximum twelve-month
prison sentence and/or a $2,500 fine for willful violation of the private
security services businesses legislation.176 Third, Virginia requires
private security services businesses to maintain a surety bond or
liability insurance as a requirement of licensing."' The bond and
liability insurance exist for individuals injured by the misconduct of
licensed private police who win a judgment that remains
unsatisfied."
In sum, increased information collection and the encouragement
of a robust civil and criminal liability system would address some of
the concerns associated with private policing. Based on the Day
majority's two-factor analysis, it is unlikely that the suggestions
outlined above would create an agency relationship because they
would not result in governmental control of an armed security
officer's individual behavior.'79 Increased regulation could be
achieved without also triggering governmental accountability for an
armed security officer's misconduct. It is possible that increased
disclosure could produce a factual record revealing significant
cooperation between private police and government actors and result
172. See VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1-142(B) (2006).
173. Id.
174. Id. § 9.1-147(A)(4).
175. § 9.1-147(B). Presumably, a licensee would have lost their license at this point, see,
e.g., id. § 9.1-145(C), but any third or subsequent conviction under this provision would
result in a class 6 felony, § 9.1-147(B); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-10(f) (2009) ("For
Class 6 felonies, a term of imprisonment of not less than one year nor more than five
years, or in the discretion of the jury or the court trying the case without a jury,
confinement in jail for not more than 12 months and a fine of not more than $2,500, either
or both.").
176. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-11(a) (2009) ("For Class 1 misdemeanors, confinement in
jail for not more than twelve months and a fine of not more than $2,500, either or both.").
177. See VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1-144(A) (2006); see also 6 VA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 20-171-
50(B)(2), -60(C)(2) (2010) (setting the minimum liability coverage for licensing and
renewal at $100,000).
178. See § 9.1-144(B).
179. See supra Part II.
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in a court finding agency.18 0 Nevertheless, any such finding would
likely be legally justified and desirable.s'
CONCLUSION
The Fourth Circuit's decision in United States v. Day is an
appropriate application of government agency case law. Without
direct guidance from the United States Supreme Court regarding the
status of private police, courts are left with difficult questions and
unclear solutions; however, courts should only find state action or
agency when the actions of private policing personnel can rightly be
attributed to the government.
Virginia's regulation of private security services businesses did
not create an agency relationship between the government and the
armed security officers who arrested, searched, and questioned Day.
Though Virginia's regulation was not entirely passive, in that it
defined the limits of the armed security officers' authority, the
government did not participate in or encourage the activities of those
officers. Furthermore, without a delegation of plenary police powers,
it is unreasonable to designate their activities as an exclusively public
function or the exercise of a sovereign power.
Concerns about the abuse of authority and the violation of
constitutional rights by armed security officers are legitimate. The
facts presented in Day, however, do not require compliance with the
procedural safeguards of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.
Ultimately, the benefits of comprehensive government regulation
may be the most viable mechanism for holding private police
accountable in this context.
COOPER J STRICKLAND"
180. See supra Part II.
181. Cf Sklansky, supra note 4, at 1268-69 (arguing that as the distinction or
separation between private and public police diminishes, the extension of constitutional
limitations to private police activities may be warranted).
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